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CHAPTER 26

Behaviorally Informed Regulation
MICHAELS. BARR
SENDHIL MULLAINATHAN
ELDAR SHAFIR

Policy makers typically approach human behavior

pertinent to regulation. We v..rill explore ho\v firms

from the perspective of the rational a gent model,

interact with consumers in different market contexts

\Vhich relics on norn1ativc, a priori analyses. The

and \Vill propose a model tOr understanding this in

nlodel assumes people make insightful, well-planned,

teraction. We \viii then develop an analytic fran1ev..rork

highly controlled, and calculated decisions guided by

fOr behaviorally infOrmed regulation and conclude

considerations of personal utility. This perspective is

\Vith examples of relevant policy applications.

promoted in the social sciences and in protCssional
schools and has come to don1inate much of the for
mulation and conduct of policy. An alternative vie\\',

Dn Behavior

developed mostly through empirical behavioral re
\Vill articulate here, provides

In contrast v..·ith the classical theory, \Vhich is driven

a substantially difierent perspective on individual

search, and the one

by rational agents v..·ho make well-infOrmed, carefully

V.'C

behavior and its policy and regulatory implications.

considered, and fully controlled choices, behavioral

According to the empirical perspective, behavior is

research has sho\vn that individuals depart from this

the an1algam of perceptions, in1pulses, judgments,

decision-making model in important \\'ays. Among

and decision processes that emerge from the impres

other things, the availability and dissemination of

sive machinery that people carry behind the eyes and

data do not always lead to effective con1n1unication

benveen the ears. Actual human behavior, it is argued,

and kno\vledgc; understanding and intention do not

is often unforeseen and mis understood by classical

necessarily lead to the desired action; and purportedly

policy thinking. A n1ore nuanced behavioral perspec

inconsequential contextual nuances, \\'hether inten

tive, it is suggested, can yield deeper understanding

tional or not, can shape behavior and alter choices,

and in1proved regulatory insight.

often in \vays that people themselves agree din1in

for a motivating example, consider the recent

ish their \\'Cll-being in unintended \vays. Individuals

mortgage crisis in the United States. While the po

often exhibit temporal biases and mistOrecast their

tential causes are 1nyriad, a central proble1n \Vas that

O\Vn behavior. By way of illustration, \Ve \viii highlight

n1any borro\vers \Vere offered and took out loans that

ho\v context, decisional conflict, mental accounting,

they did not understand and could not afford, \Vith di

knowledge and attention constraints, and institutions,

sastrous results for the borro\vers, financial firms, and

shape individual decisions and behavior.

the national economy. Borrov.'ers, like most people,
arc not \veil described by the rational agent nlodel.
At the same ti1ne, \Ve argue, a behavioral perspective
that fOcuses only on the individual is incomplete for

Context
Human behavior turns out to be hea\'ily context de

policy purposes. In so1ne contexts, firms have strong

pendent, a function of both the person and the situa

incentives to exploit consu1ner biases and v..·ill shape

tion. ()ne of the nlajor lessons of modern psychologi

their conduct in response not only to the behavior of

cal research is the in1pressi\'e po\ver that the situation

consumers but also to the actions of regulators. Thus,

exerts, along \\'ith a persistent tendency to underes

policy also needs to take into account market contexts

timate that po\vcr relative to the presumed influence

and the incentives and behaviors that they affOrd firms.

of intention, education, or personality traits. In his

I n •vhat fO!lov..·s, \\'e v.. rill outline some of the n1ain
research

underpinning

the behavioral

perspective

no\v-classic obedience studies, fOr exa1nple, Milgra1n
( 1974) sho\\·ed ho\v decidedly mild situational pres-
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persistent \Villingncss,

In contrast to this model, behavioral research sug

against their O\\'n \vishes, on the part of individuals

gests that, since pretCrences tend to be constructed

to administer \vhat they believed to be grave levels

in the context of decision, choices can prove difficult

of electric shock to innocent subjects. Along si1nilar

to make. People often search for a con1pclling ratio

lines, Darley and Batson (1973) recruited scn1inary

nale for choosing one option over another. Whereas

students to deliver a practice sermon on the parable

sometimes a compelling reason can be articulated, at

of the Good Samaritan. While half the seminarians

other' tin1cs no easy rationale presents itself� render

were told they had plenty of time, others \Vere led to

ing the conflict ber.veen options hard to resolve. Such

believe they \Vere running late. On their \vay to give

conflict can lead to the postponing of decision or to

the talk, all participants passed an ostensibly injured

a passiYe resort to a "default" option and can gener

man slumped in a door\vay groaning. Whereas the

ate prefCrence patterns that are fundamentally dit1Cr

majority of those with time to spare stopped to help,

ent fron1 those predicted by accounts based on value

a mere 10% of those \Vho \Vere running late stopped,

maximization. In particular, the addition of options

while the remaining 90% stepped over the victim and

can excessively complicate (and, thus, ''\\•orsen ") the

rushed along. In contrast \Vith these people's ethical

offered set, v.·hcreas the normative rational choice as

training, scholarship, and presumed character, the

sumption is that added options only make things bet

contextual nuance of a minor time constraint proved

ter (Iyengar and Lepper, 2000; Shafir, Simonson, and

decisive in the decision of \Vhether to stop to help

Tversky, 1993; Tversky and Shafir, 1992 ) .

a suffCring man. The powerful impact of context on

In one study, for example, expert physicians had

behavior, we argue, increases the importance of effec

to decide about medication tOr a patient \Vith osteo

tive regulation and regulators' responsibility to assess

arthritis. These physicians \\'ere more likely to de

effectiveness in policy contexts.

cline prescribing a ne\v medication when they had

Context is made all the more important because

to choose bet\veen tv.'O nev.· medications than \Vhcn

an individual's predictions about her behavior in the

only one nev.1 medication \Vas available (Rcdeln1eier

future are often made in contexts different from those

and Shafir, 1995 ). The difficulty of choosing ber.veen

in \Vhich the individual v.rill later find herself. Kochler

the t\VO medications presumably led son1c physicians

and Poon (2005; See Lev.rin, 1951) argued that peo

to recon1n1end not starting either. A sin1ilar pattern

ple's predictions of their future behavior ovcr\\•eight

was documented \vi th shoppers in an upscale grocery

the strength of their current intentions and under

store, where tasting booths of1Cred the opportunity

\veight the contextual factors that influence the likeli

to taste 6 different jan1s in one condition, or any of24

hood that those intentions \vill translate into action.

ja1ns in the second condition. ()f those \vho stopped

This imbalance can generate systematically misguided

to taste, 30% proceeded to purchase a jam in the 6 -

plans among consun1ers, \vho, reassured by their good

jams condition, \Vhereas nlore stopped but only 3%

intentions, proceed to put themselves in ill-conceived

purchased a jam in the 24-jam condition (Iyengar

situations that are pov.'crful enough to 1nake them act

and Lepper, 2000) . Of even greater relevance to the

and choose other\vise.

topic at hand, Iyengar, Jiang, and Huberman (2004)

Decisional Conflict

drops as the number of fund options nladc available

shov.,cd that en1ployees' participation in 40l(k) plans

Three decades of behavioral research have led to the

by their employer increases.
Bertrand et al. (2010) conducted

a

field experi

notion that people's preferences arc typically con

ment v.'ith a local lender in South Africa to assess the

structed, not merely revealed, during the decision

relative in1portance of various subtle psychological

nlaking process (Lichtenstein and S\oYic, 2006). The

nlanipulations in the decision to take up a loan offer.

construction of preferences is heavily influenced by

Clients were sent letters offering large, short-term

the nature and the context of decision. For exan1ple,

loans at randomly assigned interest rates. In addi

the classical viev.' of decision n1ak.ing docs not antici

tion, several psychological fCatures on the oftCr letter

pate that decisional conflict v.1ill influence the mak

\Vere also independently randomized, one of v.·hich

ing of decisions. Each option, according to the clas

\Vas the number of sample loans shcnvn: the otTer let

sical viev.', is assigned a subjective value, or "utility,"

ters displayed either one exa1nple of a loan size and

and the person then proceeds to choose the option

term, along with respective nlonthly repayments,

assigned the highest utility. A direct consequence of

or it displayed tOur such examples. In contrast \Vith

this account is that offering more alternatiYes is al\vays

standard economic thinking and in line \Vith conflict

a good thing, since the more options there are, the

bascd predictions, higher take -up \Vas observed under

more likely is the consumer to find one that proves

the one-option description than under the nlultiple

sufficiently attractive.

options version. "fhe nlagnitudc of this effCct v.'as
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large: relati\'e to the multiple-options version, the

and

single-option description had the same positive etfcct

(1.usardi, Mitchell, and C:urto,

on take-up as dropping the n1onthly interest on these
loans by 1nore than

2 percentage

bonds are held in their retirement accounts

The amount of information people can and do at
tend to is limited. Moreover,

points.

2009).

cognitive l<)ad has been

shown to aff<:ct pertOrmancc in everyday tasks. To the
extent that consumers find the1nselves in challenging

Mental Accounting

situations that are unfamiliar, tense, or distracting, all

In their intuitive mental accounting .schemes, people

of '"'hich consume cognitive resources, less focused

spending into dis

attention will be available to process the inforination

tinct budget categories, such as savings, rent, and

that is relevant to the decision at hand. This, in turn,

entertainn1ent, and into separate mental accounts,

can render decision n1aking even n1ore dependent on

assets, and fUtl1re inco1ne

situational cues and peripheral considerations, all the

c:ontrary to standard fungi

more so fOr "lov..r literate'' participants, \vho tend to

bility assumptions, people exhibit diflCrent degrees

experience even greater difficulties with eftOrt versus

compartmentalize

\vealth

such as current incon1e,
(Thaler,

1985; 1992).

and

of willingness to spend fro1n their diverse accounts.

accuracy trade-offs, show overdependence on peri1)h

(�ompartn1entalization can scr\'C useful functions in

eral cues, and tend toward a systcn1atic lvithdrawal

managing one's behavior, but it also can yield con

from many n1arkct interactions (Adkins and Ozannc,

sumption patterns that are overly dependent on cur

2005).

rent income and sensitive to labels, \Vhich can lead to

r nformation cannot be th ou ght ofas naturally yield

saving (at lo\V interest rates) and borro\ving (at higher

ing knowledge, and knowledge cannot be assun1ed to

rates) at the same time (Ausubel,

generate the requisite behavior. People often do not

1991).

An understanding of such proclivities 1nay help

fully process data that is i1nminently available because

fir1ns design instruments that bring about more desir

of Jimitations in attention, understanding, perceived

able outcomes. For instance, with respect to retire

relevance, misremen1bering, or misforccasting its in1-

n1ent saving, the tendency to spend one's savings is

pact. This is often underappreciatcd by program de

lo,ver \vhcn monies are not in transaction accounts.

signers, tt'ho tend to believe that people will kno\V

And faulty plan n ing , distraction, and procrastina

that \vhich is in1portant and kno\vable. In sumn1ary,

tion all account fOr the persistent findings that saving

for participants \Vith li1nited cognitive resources

works best as a default. l)articipation in

plans

whose decisions are heavily dependent on insufficient

is significantly higher \Vhen en1ployers otler automatic

kno\vledge, perceived norms, automatic defaults, and

enrollment (Madrian and Shea,

other n1inor contextual nuances-regulation merits

2001),

40l(k)

and because

participants tend to retain the default contribution

even greater attention \\'ith regard to nuanced behav

rates and have an easier time co1nmitting no\V to a

ioral factors.

costly step in the future, savings can be increased as a
result of agreeing to increased deductions from future
raises (Benartzi and Thaler,

2004;

sec also Benartzi,

The Power of Institutions
The substantial influence of context on behavior in1-

Peleg, and Thaler, this volume).

plies, arnong other things, that institutions \viii come
to play a central role in shaping ho\v people think and

Knowledge and Attention

\Vhat they do. By institutions, \Ve n1can forn1al lav..·s

Standard theory assumes that consumers are atten

and rules, firn1s and other organizations, structures

and kno,vledgeable and typically able to gauge

and govern1nents, and \videspread market practices

tive

and avail the1nselves of in1portant infOrmation. In

(see, e.g., Sherraden and Barr,

contrast, research

things,

suggests

that

n1any individuals

2005 ) .

A1nong other

lack kno\vledge of relevant options, program rules,

1. Institutions shape defaults, tJ1e "favored" start

benefits, and opportunities, and not only among the

ing point. It is 110\v \Vell established that defaults

poor or the uneducated. Surveys show that less than

can have a profOund influence on the outco1nes of

one-fifth of investors (in stocks, bonds, funds, or

individual choices. Data available on decisions rang

other securities) can be considered "financially liter

ing

ate" (Alexander, Jones, and Nigro,

the decision to be a \\'illing organ donor illustrate the

1998),

and sin1ilar

fro1n rc tire n1ent savings and porttOlio choices ro

findings describe the understanding sho\Vn by pen

substantial increase in n1arket share of default options

sion plan participants (Schultz,

(Johnson and Goldstein, 2003; Johnson et al.,

1995 ) .

Indeed, even

1993;

olJer beneficiaries often do not knott' lvhat kind of

see in this volume, Johnson and Goldstein; Benartzi,

pension they are set to receive, or tt'hat mix of stocks

Peleg, and l"haler). Contrary to

a

vicv.' \vherc the

BEHAVIORALLY INFORMED REGULATION

•

443

default is just one of a number of alternatives, in re
ality defaults persist. This persistence not only sten1s
from confusion about available options, procrastina
tion, forgetting, and other sources of inaction, but
also may be fostered because the default is perceived
as the most popular option (often a self-fulfilling
prophecy), is in1plicitly recomn1endcd by experts, or
is endorsed by the government.
2. Institutions shape behavior. Many lo\v-inco1nc
families are, de facto, savers, \vhether or not they re
sort to banks. But the availability of institutions to
help foster savings can n1ake a big difference (Barr,
2004; Berry, 2004). Without the help of a financial
institution, people's savings are at risk (including
tfon1 theft, impulse spending, and the needs of other
household 1nen1bcrs), savings grow more slo\vly, and
they may not be available as an emergency cushion
or to support access to reasonably priced credit in
ti1nes of need. Institutions provide safety, guidance,
and control. In circumstances of momentary need,
ten1ptati(Jn, distraction, or limited self-control, those
savers who are unbanked arc likely to find it all the
n1ore difficult to succeed on the path to !ong-tcrn1
financial stability.
C:onsider, for exan1ple, two individuals vvith no
access to credit cards: one has her paycheck directly

after hol1rs to cash their modest check fOr a hefty fCc.
3. Institutions provide implicit planning. As it
turns out, a variety of institutions provide in1plicit
planning, often in \Vays that address potential behav
ioral weaknesses. Credit card companies send custon1ers timely reminders of due payn1ents, and clients can
elect to have their utility bills automatically charged,
allov,ring them to avoid late fCes if occasionally they
do not get around to paying in ti1ne. 1'he lo\\'-income
buyer, on the other hand, without the credit card, the
automatic billing, or the \Veb-based rcn1inders, risks
missed payments, late tCes, disconnected utilities (fi)l
lowed by high reconnection charges), etc. In fact,
institutions can also sabotage planning, for exan1ple,
by providing debt too easily. Temporal discounting
in general and present bias in particular can be ex
ploited to make i1nn1ediate cash 1nore attractive than
any n1enacing future costs.
A behavioral analysis yields ne\v appreciation for

deposited into a savings account, and the other does

the i1npact of institutions, \1\'hich affect people's lives

not. Whereas cash is not readily available to the first
person, \Vho needs to take active steps to withdra\v it,
cash is im1nediately available to the second, ¥.'ho n1ust
take active n1easures to save it. The greater tendency
to spend cash in the \Valier compared to funds de
posited in the bank (Thaler, 1999) suggests that the
first, ha11ked person \viJJ spend less on impulse and
save more easily than the person \Vho is unbanked.
Holding risk- and savings-related propensities con
stant, the first person is likely to end up a nlore active
and efficient saver than the second, due to nothing
but a seen1ingly minor institutional arrangen1ent.
Direct deposit is an institution that can have a pro
found effCct on saving. A recent survey conducted by
the Atnerican Payroll Association (2002) suggests that
American employees arc gaining confidence in direct
deposit as a reliable method of pay1nent that gives
the1n greater control over their finances, and that e1n
ployers are recognizing direct deposit as a lo\v-cost
employee benefit that can also save payroll processing
time and money. 1'he en1ployers of the poor, in con
trast, often do not require nor propose electronic sal
ary payments. Instead, they prefCr not to offer direct
deposit to hourly/nonexen1pt en1ployces, temporary
or seasonal en1ployees, part-timers, union e1nployees,
and en1p1oyees in remote locations, all categories that
correlate \.Vith being lo\v paid. The most frequently

by, an1ong other things, easing their planning, help
ing them transform their intentions into actions, or
enabling their resistance to temptation. c:onsider
again the case of a lo\v-incon1e household. Having
little slack, lo\v-income households c:annot readily
cut back consun1ption in the flee of an unanticipated
need or shock (Mullainathan and Shafir, 2009). When
they do cut back, it is often on essentials. In n1any
instances, cutting back means paying late, and paying
late means incurring costly late fees, utility or phone
reconnection tees (Edin and Lein, 1997), and seri
ous disruptions to work, education, and family litC.
In other cases it means costly short-tern1 borro\ving
to avoid those consequences. In principle, the lack of
slack should provide lo\v-incon1e households a strong
incentive to increase their buffCr-stock savings to cope
\Vith a volatile environn1ent. Yet such households tend
to have negligible liquid savings, in part because the
financial systen1 makes it difficult for thcn1 to get ac
cess to affordable savings vehicles (Barr, 2004).
financial services may provide an i1nportant path
'\Vay Ollt of poverty. Such services facilitate savings to
mitigate shocks and promote asset development, and
they facilitate borro\ving to purchase higher-cost du
rables or to help weather tough times. In short, finan
cial services allovv individuals to sm(JOth consumption
and invest. ln1provement of financial services, then,

stated reasons for not oftCring direct deposit to these
en1ployees include lack of processing time to meet
standard industry (Automated Clearing House) re
quirements, high turnover, and union contract re
strictions. All this constitutes a n1issed opportunity
to offer favorable access to direct c_leposit for needy
individuals, "-'hose de facto default consists of going
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provides t\\·o key advantages. first, for individu

perfectly content to see the same individual overbor

als \vho have access to financial services, i1nprove

ro\v (abstracting from collection costs).

n1cnt \vould lo\vcr the costs they pay. For example,

\-Vith regard to the second din1ension, the market

i1nproved financial services 1nay enable thc1n to use

response to individual f"iilure can profoundly affect

a credit card rather than a n1ore expensive payday

regulation. In attempting to boost participation in

lender. Second, individuals \Vho have not had access

40l(k) retiren1ent plans, for example, the regulator

to financial services v.·ould get the direct benefits of

faces at \\'Orst indifferent and at best positively in

access, such as the ability ro borro\v to s1nooth shocks

clined employers and financial firins.1 With respect

(e.g., an illness, job loss, or divorce).

to credit, by contrast, firms often have strong inccn

Access to financial institutions allo\vs people to im

ti\'es to exacerbate psychological biases by f"iiling to

prove their planning by keeping money out of temp

highlight the costs of borro•ving. Regulation in this

tation's \vay. Din.:ct deposit and auto1natic deductions

case f3ces a niuch 1norc difficult challenge than in the

c.111 ren1ove the in1n1ediate availability of cash and put

savings situation. In forcing the disclosure of hidden

in place auton1atic sa\'ings. Financial institutions can

prices of credit, the regulator often faces uncoopera

111ake it easy fOr individuals to inake infrequent, care

tive firms, whose interests are to find ways to \vork

fully considered financial accounting decisions that

ar()und or undo regulatory interventions.

can pro\'e resistant to occasional intuiti\'e error or to

The inode of regulation chosen should take ac

n101nentary in1pulse. In this sense, improved financial

count of this interaction benveen firms and individu

institutions can have a disproportionate i1npact on the

als and behveen firn1s and regulators. One might

lives of the poor. Moving fro1n a payday lender and a

think of the regulator as holding t\vo kinds of levers,

check casher to a bank v.·ith direct deposit and payroll

\.Vhich we describe as changing the rules and chang

deduction can have benefits in the t()rm of in1proved

ing the scoring. 2 When fr>rcing disclosure of the APR,

planning, saving, tc1nptation a\'oidance, and other

for example, the regulator effectively changes the

outco1nes fJ.r inore important than the transaction

"rules" of the gan1e: •vhat a firm niust say. A stronger

costs saved.

fOrm of rule change is product regulation: changing
v.rhat a firm must do. Behavioral rule changes, such

Behavior, Markets, and Policy:
A Conceptual Framework

as creating a favored starting position or default, fall
some\vhere in bet\veen. When imposing liability, by
contrast, the regulator changes the \Vay the game
is '�scored." Liability levels can be set, in theory, to

A behavioral perspective pro\'ides a better account of

match or exceed the gains to the firm fron1 engag

ho\\' individuals niake decisions and is thus a useful

ing in the disfavored activity. Scoring can also be

correcti\'e to the rational agent n1odel. Yet a niodel

changed, fOr exan1ple, by providing tax incentives to

focused on individuals is, on its O\\'n, inco1nplete as a

engage in the favored activity or by imposing negative

basis for policy. "fhe perspective outlined above needs

tax consequences tOr engaging in a disfJ.\'ored activ

(\Vithout

to be e1nbedded in the logic of niarkets. A frame\vork

ity. Typically, changing the rules of the gan1c

is required that takes into account firms' incenti\'es

changing the scoring) alters certain behaviors \vhile

\Vith respect to indi\'idual behavior as \vell as to regu

maintaining the firms' original incentives; changing

lation. This perspective produces t\VO din1ensions

the scoring of the game can alter those incentives.

to consider: firms' interactions \Vith consumers, and
fir1ns' interactions \Vith regulators.

Understanding the interaction ben.veen individu
als, firms, and regulators in particular markets high

As tOr the first, the psychological biases of indi

lights the care that inust be taken \vhen transferring

viduals can either be aligned \Vith, or in opposition to,

behasioral economic insights from one domain to an

the interest of firn1s that 1narket products or services.

other. For example, the insights of the n1ost prominent

Consider a cons1.1n1er •vho does not fully appreciate

example of behavioral regulation-setting defaults in

the profOund etlects of the co1npounding of interest.

401 (k) participation-ought not to be mindlessly ap

This consu1ner \\'Ould be prone both to undersave and

plied to other markets. Changing the rules on retire

to overborro\v. And both the consun1er and society

n1ent saving by introducing defJ.ults \vorks well be

\\'otdd pretCr that he did not have such a bias in both

cause en1ployers' incenti\'es align (or do not niisalign)

contexts. Firn1s, tOr their part, \vould also prefer that

with regulatory etlOrts to guide individual choice. In

the individual not have the bias to undersave, so that

other \VOrds, under current conditions, employers are

funds intended tOr invest1nent and fOr fee generation

unatfected, or may even be hurt, by individuals' pro

\Votild not di1ninish (abstracting from tee structures).

pensity to undersave in 40l(k) plans.3 Consequently,

Ho\vever, at least over the short ter1n, firms \\'ould be

they will not lean against attempts to fix that problem.

BEHAVIORALLY INFORMED REGULATION

In other instances, \vhere firms' incentives misalign
\Vith regulatory intent, changing the rules alone n1ay
not \Vork since those firms have strong incentives to
\\'Ork creatively around those changes. Interestingly,
such circumstances may lead to regulations, such as
'"changing the scoring" with liability, which, although
deeply motivated by behavioral considerations, are
not themselves particularly psychological in nature.
That is, given market responses, rules based on subtle
attempts to influence individual psychology, for ex
ample through defaults or framing, may be too v.,reak,
and changes in liability rules or other measures may
prove necessary.
The distinction in market responses to individual
psychology is central to our framework and is illus
trated in table 26.1. In some cases, the market is ei
ther neutral or v.,rants to overcome consumer fallibility.
In other cases, the market would like to exploit or
exaggerate consumer fallibility. When consumers mis
understand compounding of interest in the context of
saving, banks have incentives to reduce this misunder
standing so as to increase deposits. When consumers
misunderstand compounding in the context of bor
rowing, lenders may lack the incentive to correct this
misunderstanding because they can induce consumers
to overborrow in \vays that maintain or enhance prof
itability, at least over market-relevant time horizons.4
When consun1ers procrastinate in signing up for the
Earned Income Tax Credit (and hence in filing for
taxes), private tax preparation firms have incentives to
help remove this procrastination so as to increase their
customer base. When consu1ners procrastinate in re
turning rebates (but make retail purchases intending
to get a rebate), retailers benefit. Note the parallelism
in these exan1ples: firms' incentives to alleviate or ex
ploit a bias are not an intrinsic feature of the bias itself
Instead, they are a function of how the bias plays itself
out in the particular market structure.

Market neutral and/or wants to

Market exploits consumer fallibility

overcome consumer fallibility
Consumers mis.inderstand

Consumers misunderstand

Consumers misunderstand

compounding

compounding in savings

compounding in borrowing

---)- Banks would like to reduce

---)- Banks would like to exploit

this to increase savings base

this to increase borrowing

Consumers procrastinate

445

In the consumer credit market, one \.vorrics that
many interactions between individuals and firms are
of the kind where fir1ns seek to exploit, rather than al
leviate, bias. If true, this raises the concern of overex
trapolating from the 40l(k) defaults example to credit
products. To the extent that 40l(k) defaults work
because the optimal behavior is largely aligned v.:ith
market incentives, other areas, such as credit markets,
might be more difficult to regulate \Vith n1erc de
faults. Furthermore, if the credit nlarket is dominated
by "lov..'-road" fir1ns offering opaque products that
"prey" on human v..reakness, it is more likely that regu
lators of such a market will be captured because "high
road" interests with small market share will tend to be
too weak politically to push back against the bigger
low-road players. Market forces will then defeat weak
positive interventions, such as the setting of defaults,
and low-road players will continue to don1inate. Many
observers, for example, believe that credit card mar
kets were, at least prior to passage of the c:ARD Act
in 2009, dominated by such lo\v-road practices (see,
e.g., Bar-Gill, 2004; Mann, 2007). If government
policy makers want to attempt to use defaults in such
contexts, they might need to deploy "stickier" defaults
(namely, ones that might prove costly to abandon) or
other more aggressive policy options.
In our conceptual approach to the issue of regu
latory choice (table 26.2 ), the regulator can either
change the rules of the game or change the scoring
of the game. Setting a default is an example of chang
ing the rules of the gan1e, as is disclosure regulation.
The rules of the gan1e are changed \vhen there is
an attempt to change the nature of the interactions
benveen individuals and firms, as when the regula
tion attempts to affect \vhat can be said, offered, or
done Changing the scoring of the game, by contrast,
changes the payoffs a firm will receive for particular
outcomes. This may be done \Vithout a particular rule

Table 26.1 The firm and the individual
Behavioral fallibility

•

Consumers procrastinate in

Consumers procrastinate in

signing up for EITC

returning rebates

---)- Tax filing companies would

---)- Retailers would like to exploit

like to reduce this so as to

this to increase revenues

increase number of customers
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Table 26.2 Changing the game

other\vise be too costly. On the right side of the table,
by contrast, 1narket incentives are largely nlisaligned

Rules

Set the defaults in 401(k) savings

Scoring

Penalties for 40l(k) enrollment top

to be more substantial to be effective and may need to

heavy with high-salary employees

be combined with changing the scoring.

Opt-out rule for organ donation

Grants to states that enroll organ donors

'\Vith the public interest in overcoming consumer falli
bility. In that context, rule changes will typically need

The discussion that fOllows illustrates the chal
lenge to policies in the top right-hand corner of ta
ble 26.3. Changing the rules of the game alone v,.ril\
often be insufficient when firn1s are highly motivated

about how the outcome is to be achieved. For cx

to find \vork-arounds. As such, merely setting a de

a1nplc, pension regulation that penalizes firn1s whose

fault�in contrast to defaults deployed in markets on

401(k) plan enrolhnent is top-heavy \Vith high-paid

the left side of the table-will likely not \Vork. "fhus,

executives is an example of how scoring gives firms

when '\Ve suggest opt-out policies in mortgages belo\v,

incentives to enroll low-income individuals \vithout

the challenge will be to find ways to 1nake these start

setting particular rules on ho\V this is done. (:hanging

ing positions "sticky" so that firms do not easily undo

rules and changing scoring often accompany each

their defJ.ult nature. In such cases, achieving an ef

other, but they are conceptually distinct.

fective default may require separating low-road tfo1n

Table 26.3 weaves these approaches together, il

high-road firms and making it profitable fOr high

lustrating our conceptual framework for behaviorally

road firn1s to offer the default product (for a related

informed regulation. The table shows how regula�

concept, sec Kennedy, 2005). For that to \\'ork, the

tory choice may be analyzed according to the 1nar

default must be sufficiently attractive to consun1ers,

ket's stance to\vard human fallibility. On the left side

sufficiently profitable tOr high-road firms to succeed

of the table, market incentives align reasonably well

in oftCring it, and the penalties associated \Vith devia

with society's goal of overcoming consumer fallibil

tions ti-om the default must be sufficiently costly so as

ity. Rules in that context may have a relatively lighter

to make the detault stick even in the tace of nlarket

touch. For example, using auton1atic savings plans as

pressures from low-road firn1s. In so1ne credit mar

a default in retirement saving, or providing tOr licens

kets, lo\v-road firn1s may becon1e so do1ninant that

ing and registration to ensure that standard practices

sticky detaults \Viii be ineffectual. Moreover, achieving

are tOllo'\ved. Sin1ilarly, scoring on the left side of the

such a detault is likely to be costlier than making de

table might involve tax incentives to reduce the costs

faults V.'ork v.'hen market incentives align, not least be

to firms of engaging in behaviors that align well with

cause the costs associated \Vith the stickiness of the de

their market interests and the public interest but may

tault involve greater dead-1,veight losses due to higher
costs to opt out tOr those fOr \vhom deviating fron1
the default is opti1nal. Such losses v.'ould need to be
\Veighed against the losses fron1 the current system,

Table 26.3 Behaviorally informed regulation
Market neutra I and/

Market exploits

or wants to overcome

consumer fallibility

consumer fallibility
Rules

Public education
on saving

Direct deposiU
auto-save

given the considerations above, it see1ns V.'Orth ex
ploring \vhether sticky detJ.ults can help to transform
consumer financial nlarkets in certain contexts.

Sticky defaults
(opt-out mortgage or

Sticky defaults are one of a set of examples we dis
cuss as potential regulatory interventions based on

credit card)

our proposed conceptual tfa1nework. As noted above,

Information debiasing

given market responses to relevant psychological tJ.c

(payoff time and cost for

tors in different contexts, regulation nlay need to take

credit cards)

a variety of forms, including so1ne that, v.·hile perhaps
infOrn1ed by psychology, are designed not to affCct

Licensing
Scoring

as well as against losses from alternative approaches,
such as disclosure or product regulation. Nonetheless,

Tax incentives for

Ex post liability standard

savings vehicles

for truth in lending

Direct deposit

Broker duty of care and

tax-refund accounts

changing compensation
practices (yield spread
premiums)

behavioral change but rather to alter the market struc
ture in \vhich the relevant choices are 1nade. (�iven
the complexities involved, our purpose here is not to
champion specific proposals but rather to illustrate
ho\v a behaviora!Iy inti:>nned regulatory analysis 1nay
generate a deeper understanding of the costs and ben
efits of particular policies.

BEHAVIORALLY INFORMED REGULATION
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Behaviorally Informed Financial Regulation

Because I am qualified for the loan that must

Follo\ving Barr, Mullainathan, and Shafir (2008a),

loan. Why else \Vould they lend 1ne the money?

we revie\v a set of ideas to illustrate our conceptual

Moreover, the government tightly regulates ho1ne

mean that the lender thinks that I can repay the

framework in three main areas of consumer finance:

n1ortgagcs; they make the lender give inc all these

home 1nortgagcs, credit cards, and bank accounts. We

legal tOrms. Surely the government must regulate

will use these three substantive areas to explore how

all aspects of this transaction.

changing the rules and changing the scoring can af
fect firms' behavior in market contexts where firms
have incentives to exploit consumer bias (as in credit)
and in those where firms have incentives to overcome
such biases (as in saving). Our analyses map into dif
ferent quadrants of table 26.3. Since we first pub
lished our \Vork, there has been significant progress in
implementing a nun1ber of these ideas. 5 We thcrctOrc
also discuss ho\\' some of these ideas have been re
cently in1plemented in the C:ARD Act of 2009, the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street and Consumer Protection
Act of 2010, and other policy initiatives. In addition,
with the creation of the ne\v Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (C:FPB) in the Dodd-Frank Act,
there is an opportunity to further learn fro1n behav
ioral research and to experiment \\'ith nc\V approaches.
We \vill briefly highlight son1c of these opportunities.

In reality, the government does not regulate as the
borro\ver believes, and the lender does not necessar
ily behave as the borro\ver hopes. Instead, information
is hidden tfon1 the borro\vcr, inforn1ation that \vould
improve n1arket competition and outcon1es. Given the
consun1er's probably false background assumptions
and the reality of asymmetric infOrmation favoring
the lender and broker, we suggest that creditors be re
quired to reveal useful infor1nation to the borro\.ver at
the time of the mortgage loan otter, including disclo
sure of the borro\ver's credit score and the borro\ver's
qualifications tOr the lender's n1ortgage products and
rates. Such an approach corresponds to the provision
of debiasing infOrmation, in the top right of table 26.3.
'fhe goal of these disclosures would be to put pres
sure on creditors and brokers to be honest in their
dealings \Vith applicants.

The additional inforrna

tion might improve con1parison shopping and, per

Behaviorally Informed Home Mortgage Regulation
FULL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE TO DEBIAS BORROWERS

haps, outcon1es. ()f course, revealing such informa
tion would also reduce brokers' and creditors' profit
n1argins. But because the classic market competition
model relies on full intOrmation and assun1cs ratio

With the advent of nationwide credit reporting sys

nal behavior based on understanding, this proposal

tems and the refinement of credit scoring and n1odel

sin1ply attempts to ren1ove n1arkct frictions from in

ing, the creditor and broker kncnv intOrmation about

forn1ation tJ.ilures and to n1ove n1arket con1petition

the borrov.rer that the borrO\\'CI does not necessar

more to\\·ard its ideal. By reducing intOrn1ation asym

ily kno\V about himself, including not just his credit

metry, full inforn1ation disclosure \VOtild help debias

score, but his likely perfOrmance regarding a particu

consumers and lead to more con1pctitive outco1nes.

lar set of loan products. (�reditors \vill know \Vhether
the borrower could qualify for a better, cheaper loan,
as \veil as the likelihood that he \Viii meet his obliga
tions under the existing mortgage or become delin
quent, refinance, default, or go into tOreclosure. Yet
lenders arc not required to reveal this information
to borro\vers, and the in1pact of this lack of disclo
sure is probably exacerbated by consun1er beliefS.
Consu1ners likely have fJ.lse background assumptions
regarding \\'hat brokers and creditors reveal and the
implications of their offers. What if consumers believe
the fOllo\ving:
Creditors reveal all infOrmation about me and the

EX POST STANDARDS-BASED TRUTH IN LENDING
Optimal disclosure will not occur in all n1arkets
through con1petition alone because in n1any contexts
firms have incentives to hide intOrmation about prod
ucts or prices and because consun1crs \.vi1l not insist
on con1petition based on transparency due to a lack
of kno\\1ledge or understanding and a 1nisforecasting
of their O\VO behavior. (�on1petition under a range of
plausible scenarios \Vill not necessarily generate psy
chologically infOrn1ative and actionable disclosure.
Moreover, even if all firn1s have an incentive to dis

loan products I am qualified to receive. Brokers

close in n1eaningful \.Vays, they n1ay not disclose in the

\vork tOr n1e in finding me the best loan for my

san1e \vay, thus undermining con1parison shopping by

purposes, and lenders offer n1e the best loans for

consun1ers. If co1npctition does not produce informa

\vhich I qualify. I 1nust be qualified frlr the loan I

tive disclosure, disclosure regulation might be neces

have been offered, or the lender \vould not have

sary. But the mere fact that disclosure regulation 1s

validated the choice by offCring me the loan.

needed does not n1can that it "-"ill work.
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A beha\'ioral perspective should focus in part on
improving the disclosures themselves. The goal of dis

policy intervention \vould correspond to a change in
"scoring," as in the lo\ver right of table 26.3.

closure should be to improve the quality of infOrma

An ex post version of truth in lending based on

tion about contract terms in meaningful \vays. Simply

a reasonable-person standard to complement the

adding information, fbr example, is unlikely to \Vork.

fixed disclosure rule under TILA inight pern1it

Disclosure policies are effective to the extent that they

innovation-both in products

present a fra1ne-a \vay of parsing the disclosure

disclosure-while minimizing rule evasion. An ex

that is both \veil understood and conveys salient in

post standard with sufficient teeth could change the

themselves and in

formation that helps the decision maker act optimally.

incentives of firms to confi.1se and would be more dif

It is possible, for example, that infonnation about the

ficult to evade. Under the current approach, creditors

failure frequency of particular products ( "2 out of 10

can easily "evade"Tll.A by simultaneously complying

borro\vers who take this kind of loan default") rnight

\vith its actual tenns \vhile making the required dis

help, but proper framing can be difficult to achieve

closures of the tern1s effectively useless in the context

and to maintain consistently, given that it may vary

of borrowing decisions by consun1ers with li1nited at

across situations. Moreover, the attempt to in1prove

tention and understanding. TILA, for example, does

decision quality through better consumer under

not block a creditor from introducing a more salient

standing, which is prcsu1ncd to change consumers'

term ("lower monthly cost!") to con1pcte \Vith the

intentions, and consequently their actions, is fraught

disclosed APR for borrowers' attention. By contrast,

\Vith difficulty. There is often a \vide divide between

under an ex post standards approach, lenders could

understanding, intention, and action.
Furthcrn1orc, even if meaningful disclosure rules

not plead mere compliance \Vi th a TILA rule as a de
fCnse. Rather, the question \VOuld be one of objec

can be created, sellers can generally undcn11ine what

tive reasonableness: whether the lender meaningfully

ever ex ante disclosure rule is established, in some

conveyed the information required for a typical con

contexts simply by "complying" with it: "Here's the

sumer to make a reasonable judgment about the Joan.

disclosure form I'm supposed to give you, just sign

Standards would also lo\\-·er the cost of specification

here." With rules-based, ex ante disclosure require

ex ante. (]arity of contract is hard to specify ex ante

ments, the rule is set up first, and the firm (the dis

but easier to verify ex post. Over ti1ne, through agency

closer) moves last. VVhile an ex ante rule may attempt

action, guidance, model disclosures, no-action letters,

to provide information

and facilitate comparison

and court decisions, the paran1eters of the reasonable

shopping, whatever incentives the discloser had to

ness standard \Vould become knov"n and predictable.

confuse consumers persist in the face of the regula

While TILA has significant shortcomings, \Ve do

tion. While officially complying \Vith the rule, there is

not propose abandoning it. Rather, TILA \\'Ould

market pressure to find other n1eans to avoid the salu

remain and could be in1proved with a better under

tary eftCcts on consumer decisions that the disclosure

standing of consun1er behavior. The Federal Reserve

\vas intended to achieve.

Board, fOr example, unveiled major and usefi.11 changes

In light of the challenges inherent to addressing

to its disclosure rules based on consun1er research.6

such issues ex ante, we propose that policy makers

TILA \Vould still be important in setting uniforn1

consider shifting a\vay from sole reliance on a rules

rules to permit co1nparison shopping among mort

based, ex ante regulatory structure for disclosure as

gage products, one of its t\VO central goals. Ho\Ve\'er,

embodied in the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) and

son1c of the burden ofTILA's second goal, to induce

to\vard the integration of an ex post, standards-based

firms to reveal infiJrn1ation that \vould pro111ote better

disclosure requirement in addition. Rather than sole

consumer understanding even under circun1stances in

reliance on a rule, \Ve would also deploy a standard,

\vhich the firm believes that it \Vould hurt the firn1,

and rather than sole reliance on an ex ante decision

\vould be shifted to the ex post standard.

about content, \VC \VOtild permit the standard to be

There would be significant costs to such an ap

enforced after the event, for example, after loans are

proach, especially at first. Litigation or regulatory

made. In essence, courts or the new C�FPB \vould

enfi:)rcemcnt \vould impose direct costs, and the un

deten11ine \vhcther the disclosure '\VOti!d have, under

certainty surrounding enfOrcement of the standard ex

con1mon understanding, eflCctively communicated

post might deter innovation in the developn1ent of

the key terms of the mortgage, confonning to some

mortgage products. The additional costs of compli

minimum standard, to the typical borrower.This ap

ance with a disclosure standard might reduce lenders'

proach could be similar to ex post determinations of

\villingness to develop ne\\-' n1ortgage products de

reasonableness of disclai1ners of \Varranties in sales

signed to reach lo\ver-incon1e or n1inority borrO\\'ers

contracts under UCC 2-316 (Unifonn Commercial

\Vho might not be served by the firms' "plain vanilla"

Code; see White and Summers, l 995 ) . This type of

products.7 The lack of clear rules 1night also increase

BEHAVIORALLY INFORMED REGULATION

consumer confusion regarding ho\v to co1npare inno
vative mortgage products to each other, even \\'hile
it increases consumer understanding of the products
being offered. Ultimately, if consumer confusion re
sults mostly from firm obfuscation, then our proposal
\Vill likely help a good deal. By contrast, if consumer
confusion in this context results n1ostly tl-om market
con1plexity in product innovation, then the proposal
is unlikely to make a major difference and other ap
proaches focused on loan comparisons might be \Var
ranted (see, e.g., Thaler and Sunstcin, 2008, this
volume).
Despite the shortco1nings of an ex post standard
for truth in lending, \Ve believe that such an approach
is \.VOrth pursuing. To limit the costs associated \Vith
our approach, the ex post detern1ination of reason
ableness could be significantly confined. For exa1nple,
if courts are to be involved in enforcement, the ex
post standard tOr reasonableness of disclosure 1night
be limited to providing a (partial) defense to full pay1nent in foreclosure or bankruptcy, rather than being
open to broader enforcen1ent through affirmative suits
tOr damages. Alternatively, rather than court enforce
ment, the ex post standard might be applied solely
by the C:FPB through supervision. Furthermore, the
ex post exposure 1night be significantly reduced
through ex ante steps. For exan1ple, the CFPB might
develop safe harbors for reasonable disclosures, issue
n1odcl disclosures, or use no-action letters to provide
certainty to lenders. Moreover, firms might be tasked
with conducting regular surveys of borrowers or con
ducting experimental design research to validate their
disclosures; results from the research demonstrat
ing a certain level of consun1er understanding might
provide a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness
or even a safe harbor ffom challenge:s �fhe key is to
give the standard sufficient teeth without deterring
innovation. The precise contours of enforce1nent and
liability arc not essential to the concept, and \veigh
ing the costs and benefits of such penalties, as \Veil as
detailed implementation design, are beyond the scope
of introdL1cing the idea here.
STICKY OPT-OUT MORTGAGE REGULATION

While the causes of the n1ortgage crisis are myriad� a
central problen1 \Vas that many borro\vers took out
loans that they did not understand and could not af·
tOrd. Brokers and lenders offered loans that looked
much less expensive than they really \Vere, because
of lo\.v initial monthly payments and hidden, costly
features. Families comn1only make n1istakes in tak
ing out hon1e mortgages because they are misled by
broker sa1es tactics, n1isunderstand the complicated
tern1s and financial tradcoffs in mortgages, \vrongly
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tOrecast their O\Vn behavior, and 1nisperceive their risk
of borro\ving. Ho\\' many hon1eo\vners really under
stand ho\v the teaser rate, introductory rate, and reset
rate relate to the London Interbank Offered Rate
plus son1e specified margin, or ho\v many can judge
\vhether the prepayment penalty \vill offSet the gains
fron1 a teaser rate?
Altering the rules of the game of disclosure, and
altering the "scoring" fr>r seeking to evade proper
disclosure, n1ay be sufficient to reduce the \vorst out
comes. However, if market pressures and consun1er
confusion arc sufficiently strong, such disclosure n1ay
not be enough. If market complexity is sufficiently
disruptive to consu1ner choice, product regulation
1night prove most appropriate. for example, by bar
ring prepayn1ent penalties, one couki reduce lock-ins
to bad 1nortgages; by barring short-tern1 ARMs and
balloon payments, one could reduce the pressure to
refinance; in both cases, more of the cost of the loan
\vould be pushed into interest rates, and competition
could focus on an explicitly stated price in the form
of the APR. Such price competition \Vould benefit
consumers, \vho \vould be nlore likely to understand
the tcrn1s on \vhich lenders \Vere competing. Product
regulation \.vould also reduce cognitive and emotional
pressures related to potentially bad decision 1naking
by reducing the nun1ber of choices and eliminating
loan teatures that put pressure on borro\vers to re
finance on bad terms. Ho\.vever, product regulation
may stifle beneficial innovation, and there is ahvays
the possibility that the government may simply get
it \vrong, prohibiting good products and permitting
bad ones.
For that reason, \Ve proposed a nc\.v form of rcg
ulation.9 We proposed that a default be established
\Vith increased liability exposure tOr deviations that
harm consumers. For lack of a better term, \Ve called
this a sticky opt-out mortgage systcn1. A sticky opt
out systcn1 \vould fall, in ter1ns of stri11gency, bet\.Vecn
product regulation and disclosure. For reasons \.\'e
\.vill explain belo\\·, n1arket tOrces \vould likely s\.va1np
a pure opt-out regime-that is \vhcrc the need tOr
stickiness came in. "fhis approach corresponds to a
combination of changing the rules of the gan1e (top
right of table 26.3), .1nd changing liability standards
(botton1 right of that table).
'fhe proposal is grounded in our equilibriun1
nlodel of incentives frlr firms and of indiYidual psy
chology. Many borro\vers may be unable to co1nparc
complex loan products and act optimally for then1selves based on such an understanding (see, e.g.,
Ausubel, 1991). We thus deploy an opt-out stratet,'Y
to make it easier tOr borrowers to choose a standard
product and harder tOr then1 to choose a product
they are less likely to understand. At the same tin1c,
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lenders 1nay seek to extract surplus from borro\vers

Act, if Congress \Vere to revisit the issue, it could au

because of asymn1ctric intOrmation about future in

thorize the CFPB to entOrce the require1nent on a

co1nc or dctiult probabilities (Musto, 2007), and, in

supervisory basis rather than relying on the courts.

the short tenn, lenders and brokers may benefit tfom

The agency would be responsible for supervising the

selling bornnvcrs loans they cannot afford. Thus, a

disclosures according to a reasonableness standard

pure dctJ.ult v-.rould be undennincd by the firms, and

and would impose a fine on the lender and order

regulation needs to take account of this market pres

corrective actions if the disclosures were tOund to be

unreasonable. "fhe precise nature of the stickiness re

sure by pushing back.
Tn our 1nodel, lenders \vould be required to offer

quired and the trade-oftS involved in imposing these

eligible borro,vcrs a standard mortgage (or set of

costs on lenders would need to be explored in greater

1nortgages),

a fixed-rate, sclf-an1or tizing

detail, but in principle, a sticky opt-out policy could

thirty-year n1ortgage loan or a standard ARM: prod

eftCctively leverage the behavioral insight that detJ.ults

such as

Lh.-t according to reasonable undcr\vriting standards.

matter with the industrial organizational insight that

The pn.:cisc contours of the standard set of mortgages

market incentives V.'ork against the advantages of a

\vould be set by regulation. Lenders \vould be free

pure opt-out policy in n1any credit markets.

to charge \vhatevcr interest rate they \vanted on the

An opt-out mortgage system \vith stickiness might

loan and, subject to the constraints outlined belo\v,

provide several benefits over current market outcon1es.

could ofter \vhatever other loan products they \\'anted

For one, a "plain vanilla" set \Vould be easier to com

outside of the standard package. Borrowers, however,

pare across mortgage offers. IntOrmation \vould be

\vould get the standard mortgage otlCred, unless they

more efficiently transmitted across the market. Con

chose to opt out in tJ.vor of a nonstandard option ot:

sumers would be likely to understand the key terms

fered by the lender, after honest and con1prchensibk:

and features of such standardized products better

disclosures fron1 brokers or lenders about the tern1s

than they \vould alternative n1ortgage products. Price

and risks of the alternative mortgages. An opt-out

con1petition \Vott!d be more salient once the features

tnortgage syste111 \vould n1ean borrowers \vould be

\Vere standardized. Behaviorally, when alternative,

tnore likely to get straightfor\\'ard loans they could

"non-vanilla" products are introduced, the consumer

understand.

\vould be made <.n.vare that these represent deviations

Rut a plain-vanilla opt-out policy is likely to be in

from the dctJ.ult, anchoring consumers on the de

adequate. Unlike the savings context, \vherc market

tJ.ult product and providing some basic expectations

incentives align \Veil \Vith policies to overcon1e be

tOr \vhat ought to enter into the choice. Fran1ing the

havioral biases, in the context of credit 111arkets, firms

mortgage choice as one bet\veen accepting standard

ofren have an incentive to hide the true costs of bor

n1ortgage otfers and needing affirn1atively to choose

ro\ving. Given the strong market pressures to devi

a nonstandard product should improve consumer

ate tfon1 the detJ.ult oftCr, \\'e \Vould need to require

decision making. Creditors \vill be required to make

111ore than a si111ple opt-out to 111ake the defJ.ult stick.

heightened disclosures about the risks of alternative

Deviation fron1 the offer \vould require heightened

loan products, subject to legal sanction in the event

disclosures and additional legal exposure for lenders

of failure to reasonably disclose such risks; the legal

in order to make the detJult sticky. Under our plan,

sanctions should deter creditors tfom making highly

lenders \vould have stronger incentives to provide

unreasonable alternative offers \Vi th hidden and con1-

n1eaningful disclosures to those \vhon1 they convince

plicatcd tenns. c:onsumcrs may be less likely to make

to opt out, because they \\'ould face increased regula

significant n1istakes. In contrast to a pure product reg

tory scrutiny or increased costs if the loans did not

ulation approach, the sticky default approach alknvs

\Vork out.
future \vork v.·ill need to explore in greater de
tail the entOrce1nent mechanism. for exan1ple, under

lenders to continue to develop ne\v kinds of mort
gages, but only v.:hen they can adequately explain key
terms and risks to borro\vers.

one potential approach to 1naking the opt-out sticky,

Moreover, requiring a default acco1npanied by

if detJ.ult occurs after a bornl\ver has opted out, the

heightened disclosures and increased legal exposure

borro\ver could raise the lack of reasonable disclosure

tOr deviations 1nay help boost high-road lending rela

as a defense to bankruptcy or fOreclosure. Using an

tive to lo\v-road lending-at least if deviations result

objective reasonableness standard akin to that used

ing in harm are appropriately penalized. If offering an

tOr \\'arranty analysis under the UnitOrn1 Commercial

opt-out mortgage product helps to split the n1arket

c:ode,111 if the court detern1ined that the disclosure

bet\veen high- and lov,.r-road firms and re\vards the

\vould not effectively con1n1unicate the key tenns

fonner, the 1narket 1nay shift (back) to\vard finns that

and risks of the mortgage to the typical borro\ver,

ofter home mortgage products that better serve bor

the court could modit)r the loan contract. Although

ro\vers. For this to \York effectively, the default-and

Congress rejected this proposal in the Dodd-Frank

etlorts to make it sticky-should enable the consumer
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easily to distinguish the typical "good'� loan, benefit

If Congress \Vere to revisit this proposal in the fu

ing both lender and borrov.'er, from a \vide range of

ture, it could authorize the CFPB to implement such

"'bad" loans that benefit the lender \Vith higher rates

a program . Supervisory implementation \\'Ould help

and fees but harm the borrov,rer; that benefit the bor

to improve the standard mortgage choice set and to

rower but harm the lender; or that harn1 borrower

reduce enforcement costs over time. The CFPB could

and lender but benefit third parties, such as brokers.

be required periodically to revie\v the defaults and to

There will be costs associated with requiring an

conduct consun1er experimental evaluation or survey

opt-<)Ut hon1e n1ortgage . For example, sticky defaults

research to test both the products and the disclosures,

n1ay not be sticky enough to alter outcon1es, given

so that these stay current with developments in the

market pressures. The default could be undermined

home mortgage market. Indeed, lenders might be re

through the firm's incentive structures for loan offi

quired to conduct such research and to disclose the

cers and brokers, which could provide greater rewards

results to the CFPB and the public upon developing

fi:)r nonstandard loans. Implementation of the measure

a new product and its related disclosures. In addition,

may be costly, and the disclosure requirement and un

the CFPB might use the results of the research to

certainty regarding enforcement ofthe standard might

provide safe harbors or no-action letters for disclo

reduce overall access to home mortgage lending. There

sures that are shown to be reasonable ex ante. The

n1ay be too many cases in which alternative products

CFPB could conduct ongoing supervision and test

are optin1al, so that the default product is in essence

ing of compliance with the opt-out regulations and

"'incorrect" and comes to be seen as such. The default

disclosure requirements. Through such no-action let

\Vould then matter less over time, and the process

ters, safe harbors, supervision, and other regulatory

of deviating from it \Vould become increasingly just

guidance, the CFPB can develop a body of law that

another burden (like existing disclosure paper\vork)

would increase compliance across the diverse financial

along the road to getting a home inortgage loan. Lo\\'

sectors involved in mortgage lending, \vhile reducing

income, minority, or first-time homeowners who have

the uncertainty facing lenders from the ne\V opt-out

benefited fron1 more flexible under\vriting and more

requirement and providing greater freedom for finan

innovative mortgage developn1ents might see their ac

cial innovation.

cess reduced if the standard set of mortgages does not
include products suitable to their needs.
()ne could improve these outcomes in a variety
of \vays. For example, the opt-out regulation could

RESTRUCTURE T H E RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BROKERS
ANO BORROWERS

require that the standard set of mortgages include

An additional approach to addressing the problem of

a thirty-year fixed n1ortgage , a five- or seven-year

market incentives to exploit behavioral biases would

adjustable-rate mortgage , and straightforward mort

be to focus directly on restructuring brokers' duties

gages designed to meet the particular needs of first

to borrowers and reforming con1pensation schemes

time, minority, or lo\v-income homeo\\rners . ()nc

that provide incentives to brokers to mislead borrow

might develop "'sn1art defaults," based on key bor

ers. Mortgage brokers have dominated the subprime

rO\\'er characteristics, such as income and age. With a

market. Brokers generally have been compensated

handful of key facts, an optimal default might be of

veith yield spread premiums (YSP) for getting bor

fered to an individual borro\ver. The optimal default

ro\vers to pay higher rates than those for \\'hich the

\\'ould consist of a mortgage or set of mortgages that

borro\ver would qualify. Such YSPs have been used

1nost closely align with the set of mortgages that the

widely. 11 In loans with YSPs, unlike other loans, there

typical borro\ver with that income, age, and educa

is a \vide dispersion in prices paid to mortgage bro

tion \\'ould prefer. For example, a borro\ver with ris

kers. As Jackson and Burlingame (2007) have sho\\'n,

ing income prospects might appropriately be offered

\Vithin the group of other\vise comparable borrow

a five-year adjustable rate mortgage . Smart defaults

ers paying YSPs, African Americans paid $474 more

might reduce error costs associated \Vith the pro

tOr their loans, and Hispanics $590 more, than white

posal and increase the range of mortgages that can

borro\vers; thus, even if minority and white borrowers

be developed to meet the needs of a broad range

could qualify for the san1e rate, in practice minority

of borro\vers, including lo\ver-income or first-time

borro\vers are likely to pay 1nuch more .12

homeo\vners; ho\Vever, smart defaults may add to

Brokers cannot be monitored effectively by bor

consumer confusion. Even if the consumer (with the

ro\\'ers (See Jackson and Burlinga1ne, 2007), and it is

particular characteristics encompassed by the smart

dubious that additional disclosures \Vould help bor

default) faces a single default product, spillover from

rowers be better monitors (see, e.g., Federal Trade

opticH1S across the market may make decision making

(�on1mission, 2007), because, an1ong other things,

n1ore difficult. Finally, it may be difficult to design

borrowers do not always recognize potential conflicts

smart defaults consistent \vith fair lending rules.

of interest and because brokers' disclosures of such
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conflicts can paradoxic.1lly increase consumer trust

higher-cost products; and bans YSPs. The act requires

(C:ain, Loc,venstcin, and Moore, 2005 ). When a bro

that mortgage brokers and lenders assess a borro\ver's

ker is seen to divulge that he \Vorks for hin1selt� not in

ability to repay based on docun1cntcd inco1nc, taking

the interest of the bornnvcr, the borrower's trust in

into account the fully indexed, fully amortizing rate on

the broker may increase: here is a broker \vho is being

a mortgage. The act prohibits 1nandatory predispute

honest! Moreover, the subpri1ne mortgage crisis sug

arbitration clauses (\vhich lin1it one's right to access

gests that \vhile in theory creditors and investors have

the courts), and it enhances disclosure requirements.

some incentives to monitor brokers, they do not do

It requires the use of escrow of taxes and insurance for

so effectively.
It is possible to undertake an array of structural

higher-cost loans and

i1nprovcs escrow disclosure for

all loans. It makes a number of changes to the Home

changes regarding the broker-borrO\\'Cr relationship.

Ownership and Equity Protection Act (H()EPA) to

For cxan1ple, one could alter the incentives of credi

make it more effective and provide greater consumer

tors and investors to monitor mortgage brokers by

protection.

changing liability rules so that broker misconduct

The Dodd-Frank Act also puts in place t\vo provi

can be attributed to lenders and creditors in suits by

sions that tOster standardization in the products of

2007). One could

fered to consumers. The act requires risk retention

directly regulate mortgage brokers through licensing

tOr securitization of mortgage loans but exempts

bornl\vers (sec Engel and McCoy,

and registration requiren1cnts (as is done else\.vhere,

Qualified Residential Mortgages, which are designed

e.g., in the United Kingdom); recent U.S. legislation,

to be standard, high-quality mortgage products \\'ith

kno\vn as the SAFE Act, no\\' mandates licensing and

straightfor\vard tenns and solid under\\rriting. for

reporting requirements for brokers. In addition, the

loans falling outside this category that are securi

ex post disclosure standard we suggest n1ight have a

tized, the securitizer (or the originator) would need

salutary eftCct by making it 1nore costly for lenders

to retain capital to back a portion of the securitiza

\Vhen brokers evade disclosure duties, thus generating

tion risk. There \vould thus be a strong incentive to

better monitoring of brokers.

make Qualified Residential Mortgages. The Dodd

We also suggest that the duties of care that mort

frank Act also sets out provisions for qualified 1nort

gage brokers owe to borro¥.'ers should be raised. A

gages, ones tOr \\'hich the ability-to-pay requirc1nent

higher duty of care \\'ould 1nore closely confOrm to

is dee1ned to be 1net. In sum, the act defines an ap

borro\\1Cr expectations about the role of mortgage

proach to the standardization of the tern1s and under

brokers in the market. In addition, we support the

writing of such mortgages. Lenders making nonquali

banning of YSPs that are based on the interest rate

fied n1ortgages face a larger potential risk of liability in

charged, for example. Banning YSPs could reduce

the event that such loans fail.

abuses by elin1inating a strong incenti\'e tOr brokers

More fundamentally, the act put in place the new

to seek out higher-cost loans tOr custo1ners. ln fact,

CFPB to supervise major financial institutions and to

a nun1ber of lenders moved a\vay fro1n YSPs to fixed

set rules and enfi)rce consun1cr protections across the

tCes \Vith son1c funds held back until the loan has per

market. In addition to its authorities to set rules tOr

tOrn1ed well tOr a period of time, precisely because

and enforce existing consun1er financial protection

of broker conflicts of interest in seeking higher YSPs

la\vs, the CFPB has the authority to ban unfair, de

rather than sound loans. Banning YSPs is another \Vay

ceptive, or abusive acts or practices. The bureau can

to reintOrce high-road practices and protect against

also prescribe rules tOr disclosures of any consu1ner fi

a renewed and profitable 10¥.r-road push to increase

nancial product. In doing so, it v.rill rely on consun1er

1narket share once stability is restored to mortgage

testing, can issue model disclosures that provide a safe

markets. Banning YSPs affects the payoff that brokers

harbor tOr compliance, and n1ay pern1it financial in

receive for mortgage products and thus constitutes a

stitutions to use trial disclosure programs to test out

tOrm of scoring change, corresponding to regulation

the eftCctiveness of alternative disclosures to those

in the bottom right of table 26.3.

pro\'ided tOr in the CFPB 1nodel tOrm. The Bureau
is 1nandated to merge conflicting n1ortgage disclo

PROGRESS UNDER THE DODD-FRANK ACT

sures fron1 the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act
(RESPA) and TILA into a simple tOrm. (�onsumers

The Dodd-frank Act fundan1entally reforms con

are provided \Vith rights to access infr>nnation about

sumer financial protection policy in the United States.

their O\vn product usage in standard, machine

In the mortgage market, the Dodd-Frank Act un

readable tOrmats. Over time, the CFPB 1nay generate

dertakes a number of steps to regulate the relation

research and cxperin1cntation that \\'ill i1nprove our

ship ben.veen borrowers and 1nortgage brokers. For

understanding of consun1er financial decision mak

exa1nple, the act requires registration and i1nposes a

ing, and in turn v.'ill support the bureau's supervision,

duty of care on mortgage brokers; bans steering to

rule-\\Titing, and cnforcc1ncnt.
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In addition to these changes to consumer finan

proposed changes to its regulations under TILA,

cial protection, the act makes a nu1nber of changes

partly in the v..'ake of amendments contained in the

to in\'estor protection. For exan1ple, it provides the

bankruptcy legislation. 16 Under the proposals, tOr ex

Securities and Exchange Con1n1ission (SEC) \Nith

an1ple, creditors \vould need to disclose that paying

authority to engage in investor testing to i1nprove

only the minin1um balance \vould lengthen the payoff

disclosures or other rules. The SEC is authorized to

time and interest paid on the credit card; describe a

clarify the duties of invest1ncnt advisors and broker

hypothetical example of a payoff period paying only

dealers so that they have the same high standard of

the niinin1um balance; and provide a toll�frce nu1nber

care-a fiduciary duty (\vhich, until no\v, investrncnt

fOr the

advisors had but broker-dealers providing individual

otf tiine. 1 7 Although the very length and complexity

ized investment advice did not). 'fhe con1mission is

of the board's proposal hints at the difficulty of the

also authorized to require better disclosures of bro

task of disclosure to alter consun1er understanding

cons111ner to

ohtain an estimate of actual pay

ker duties and conflicts of interest and to n1andate

and behavior, such i1nproved disclosures might nev

prcsalc disclosures for investn1ent products. Like the

ertheless help.

CFPB, the SEC: is authorized to restrict 111andatory

In earlier \Vork (Barr, Mullainathan, and Shafir,

predispute arbitration. These changes should niateri

2008a ), we proposed that c:ongress could require

ally advance investor protections consistent \Vith the

that minimun1 payment terms be accompanied by

frame\vork we have laid out.

clear statcn1ents regarding ho\v long it \VOtild take,
and how n1uch interest V..'ould be paid, if the custo1n
er's actual balance were paid off in 1nini1num pay

Behaviorally Informed Credit Card Regulation

ments, and card con1panics could be required to state
the monthly payn1ent amount that y.,rould be required

USING FRAMING AND SALIENCE IN DISCLOSURES TO

to pay the custon1er's actual balance in full over some

ENCOURAGE GOOD C R E D IT CARD BEHAVIOR

reasonable period of tin1e, as detern1ined by regula

Credit card companies have fine-tuned product offer

tion. These tailored disclosures use framing and sa

ings and disclosures in a 1nanner that appears to be

lience to help consumers, \vhose intuitions regarding

systen1atically designed to prey on common psycho

compounding and tin1ing are \Veak, to 111ake bettcr

logical biases-biases that lin1it consu1ner ability to

infonned borro\ving and payn1ent choices based on

n1ake opti1nal choices regarding credit card borro\ving

their specific circumstances. Such an approach \vould

( Bar-(;ill, 2004). Behavioral econon1ics suggests that

niandatc behaviorally informed changes in informa

consumers underestimate ho\v much they \vill borro\v

tion disclosure rules in order to help debias consum

and o\'eresti1nate their ability to pay their bills in a

ers (corresponding to the top right of table 26.3).

timely manner, and credit card companies then price

Although credit card con1panies have opposed such

their credit cards and compete on the basis of these

ideas in the past, disclosures based on the customer's

fundan1ental hu rnan failing�. Nearly 60% of

actual balances arc not overly burdcnson1e, as evi

cre

dit

card holders do not pay their bills in full e\'ery month

denccd by their implementation fOllowing the c:ARD

(Bucks et al., 2006). Moreover, excessive credit card

Act of 2009.

debt can lead to bankruptcy (Mann, 2006). Mann

Disclosures regarding the expected tin1e to pay
.
off actual credit card balances arc designed to f tcili

(2007) has argued that credit card companies seek to
keep consumers in a "s\N·eat box" of distressed credit

tate clearer thinking but may not be strong enough

card debt, paying high fees fOr as long as possible be

to 111atter. f,\'cn if such disclosure succeeds in shap

fore finally succun1bing to bankruptcy.

ing intention, v..re kno\v that there is often a large gap

The 2005 bankruptcy legislation focused on the

bet\veen intention and action. JH In tact, borro\vers

need tOr in1proved borro\ver responsibility but paid

\vould need to change their behavior in the face of

insufficient attention to creditor responsibility frlr

strong inertia and marketing by credit card compa

bornJv..'ing patterns. 13 Credit card con1panies pro

vided complex disclosures regarding teaser rates, in

nies, \vhich often propel then1 to make no more than
mini1nun1 payn1cnts. More generally, once enacted,

troductory tern1s, variable rate cards, penalties, and a

market players opposed to such disclosures \vould

host of other nlatters. Both the terms themselves and

pron1ptly \York to undermine then1 \\'ith countervail

the disclosures \\'ere confusing to consuiners.14 Credit

ing nlarketing and other policies. And there could be

card companies, it appears, \Vere not con1peting to

occasional costs in other directions: tOr example, con

otter the 1nost transparent pricing.

sumers \Vho used to pay 1nore than the amount re

The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency

quired to pay off their bills in the ti1ne fra111c specified

required national banks to engage in better credit

by regulators nlay nov.' be drav..'n to pay off their bills

card practices and to provide greater transparency

more slov..,ly. Recent prelin1inary research by Tufano

on 111inin1un1 paymcnts,15 and the federal Reserve

(2009) suggests that the CARD Act may have had this
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mixed ctfect-improving the outcomes fOr borro\vers

In earlier \Vork, \Ve proposed changing the scor

who paid more slowly, \vhilc \\'Orsening the outcomes

ing of the game (corresponding to a regulatory choice

for those '"'ho previously caught up more quickly than

in the bottom right of table 26.3). Under our pro

the statement's anchor on a payoff plan of three years.

posal, firn1s could deter consumers from paying late
or going over their credit card limits \Vith whatever

AN OPT-OUT PAYMENT PLAN FOR CREDIT CARDS

fees they deemed appropriate, but the bulk of such
tees would be placed in a public trust to be used tOr

A related approach, intended to fJ.c ilitate behavior

financial education and assistance to troubled bor

through intention, \Vould be to develop an opt-out

ro\vers. Firn1s \Vould retain a fixed percentage of the

payment plan for credit cards under which consumers

tees to pay for their actual costs incurred from late

would need to elect a default payment level meant

pay1nents or over-lin1it charges, and tOr any increased

to pay off their existing balance over a chosen pe

risks of default that such behavior presages. The ben

riod of tin1e unless the custon1er affirmatively opted

efit of such an approach is that it per1nits fir1ns to

out and chose an alternative payn1ent at any point. 19

c:onsu1ners could elect to alter their chosen payn1ent

deter "bad conduct" by consumers who pay late or
go over credit liinits but prevents fir1ns fro1n profiting

plan in advance or could, ¥.'ith modest friction costs,

fro1n consun1ers' predictable n1isforecasts regarding

opt out and change the plan at the tin1e they receive

their own late payment and over-the-limit behaviors.

their bill. Such an approach corresponds to changing

Firms' incentives to encourage or overcharge tOr such

the rules through opt-out policies (top right of ta

behaviors \vould be ren1ovcd, \.vhile their incentives

ble 26.3). Given \vhat v.'e kno\.v al)out default rules,

to deter consumer f3.ilures appropriately and cover a

such payment plans may create expectations about

firm's costs v.·hen they occur \vould be maintained.

consu1ner conduct, and in any event, inertia would
cause many households simply to tOllo"'' the initially
chosen plan. Increasing such behavior, as driven by

ADVANCES IN THE CARD ACT OF 2009

prior intentions, could mean lo\ver rates of interest

The CARD Act of 2009 enacted a number of key

and fees paid, and lower incidences of financial fail

changes to the credit card 1narket that take seriously

ure. A chosen opt-out payment plan may also impose

the behavioral insights and the incentives of firms to

costs. Son1e consu1ners \vho, in the absence of the

exploit consun1er failings. For example, the CARD

opt-out plan, \vould have paid off their credit cards

Act provides for improvements in plain language

sooner, might underestimate their capacity and opt

disclosures and timing on credit card agreements. It

f(>r a slov.'er payment plan, thus incurring higher costs

requires credit card companies to notif).• consumers

from interest and fees. Alternatively, son1e consumers

tOrty-five days in advance of certain major changes

may fOllov.' their chosen opt-out payment plan \\'hen

to card tern1s, such as interest rates and fees, and it

it is unaftOrdable for them, consequently reducing

requires that disclosures include infOr1nation on the

necessary consumption, such as medical care or suf

tin1e and cost of making only the minin1un1 payment,

ficient food, or incurring other costly forms of debt.

as \Vell as the time and cost of paying off the balance

Still, conffonting the need to determine a default pay

\Vithin three years. Moreover, consumers are provided

ment plan may tOrce card holders to address the real

with nlonthly and year-to-date figures on interest

ity of their borrowing and help to alter their borro\v

costs and fCcs incurred, so that they can n1orc read

ing behavior or their payoff plans.

ily con1pare anticipated costs with their actual usage
patterns. The act requires firms to obtain consumers'

REGULATE LATE FEES

consent-an opt�i n-for over-limit transactions. The
act bans practices such as certain retroactive rate hikes

One problen1 with the pricing of credit cards is that

on existing balances, late tee traps (including mid-day

credit card firms can charge late and over-limit fees

due ti1nes, due dates less than nventy-one days after

with relative impunity because consumers typically

the time of mailing staten1ents, and nloving due dates

do not believe ex ante that they \vill pay such fees.

around each month), and double cycle billing. 'fhese

Instead, consumers shop based on other f3.ctors, such

practices have in common that consun1ers cannot

as annual fees, interest rates, or various rev.'ard pro

readily shape their behavior to avoid the charges; the

grams. I n principle, fir1ns need to charge late and

fees or changes in question arc not readily shopped

over-limit fees in order to incentivize customers to

tOr in choosing a credit card, and disclosures are of

avoid late fees and going over their credit limits. Jn

little help. Since consuJners generally do not under

practice, given the high fees they charge, credit card

stand how payments are allocated across account

firms are perfectly content to let consumers pay late

balances even after improved disclosures (Federal

and exceed their limits.

Reserve 2007a,b, 2008 ), the act requires a consun1er's
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payments above the minimum required to be applied

small incon1e fluctuations n1ay create serious problen1s

first toward higher-cost balances. In addition, the act

in paying rent, utilities, or other bills. Moreover, the

takes up the concern \Vith late tCes but goes beyond

high costs and lo\\' utility of financial services used by

our proposals. Instead, recognizing that consumers

many lo\v-income households extract a daily toll on

do not shop for penalty fees and that they often mis

take-hon1e pay. Limited access to mainstrca1n financial

forecast their O\Vn behavior, it requires that late tCcs

services reduces ready opportunities to save and limits

and other penalty fees be ''reasonable and propor

fan1ilies' ability to build assets and save tOr the fu ture.

tionate," as detern1ined by implementing rules; that

In theory, opt-out policies ought to \vork \Veil

in any event the fees not be larger than the amount

among LMI households, as in the retirement \\'Orid,

charged that is over the limit or late; and that a late

in encouraging saving. However, while in general the

fee or other penalty tee cannot be assessed more than

1narket pulls in the same direction as policy in encour

once frlr the san1e transaction or event. Furthermore,

aging saving, market fOrces v.1eaken or break do\\'n en

the act takes steps to make it easier fOr the market to

tirely \\.ith respect to encouraging LMI households'

develop mechanisms for consun1er comparison shop

saving. This is si1nply because the administrati\'e costs

ping by requiring the public posting to the Federal

of collecting sn1all-value deposits are high in rela

Reserve of credit card contracts in inachine-readable

tion to the banks' potential earnings on the relatively

formats. Private finns or nonprofits can then develop

small a1nounts saved, unless the bank can charge high

tools for experts and consumers to use to evaluate

fees; and \Vith sufficiently high tees, it is not clear

these various contracts. The CFPB v.rill undoubtedly

that utilizing a bank account n1akcs economic sense

have occasion to revie\v these and other requirements

for LMI households. Indeed, the current structure

in the future.

of bank accounts is one of the primary reasons \vhy
LMI households do not have then1. High minin1um

Increasing Saving among Low- and
Moderate-Income Households

balance requirements, high tees for overdraft protec
tion or bounced checks, and delays in check clear
ance, dissuade LMI households from opening or re

We have focused in this chapter on i1nproving out

taining bank transaction accounts. Moreover, banks

comes in the credit markets using insights from be

use the private ChexSystem to screen out households

havioral economics and industrial organization. ()ur

\Vho have had difficulty \\'ith accounts in the past.

focus derives from the relative lack of attention to this

Behaviorally insightful t\veaks, \Vhile helpful, are un

area in the behavioral literature thus far and from the

likely to suffice in this context; rather, along \Vith the

fact that credit markets pose a challenge to approaches

behavior of consu1ners \vho open and inaintain them,

that do not pay sufficient heed to the incentives firms

\Ve need to change the nature of the accounts being

have to exploit consumer biases. Savings is another

offered.

area ripe fOr further exan1ination. Whereas n1uch of

Proposals in this area pertain to changing the rules

the behaviorally infonned policy \Vork on saving has

and the scoring on the left-hand side of table 26.3,

thus far tOcused on using def3ults to improve retire

\vhere markets may prove neutral to, or even positively

ment saving, many lo\v- and moderate-income (LMI)

inclined tOv.'ard, the potential reduction of consun1er

households have a much greater need to focus on

tJ.llibility. We need to figure out ho\v to increase scale

basic banking services and short-tern1 savings options,

and to offset costs fi>r the private sector to increase

services which, fOr this population, are likely to re

saving by LMI families. We propose three options: a

quire a different mix of governmental responses than

new "gold seal" tOr financial institutions in return tOr

those in the context of retiren1ent savings fOr middle

oftCring sate and affordable bank accounts; various

and upper-inco1ne households.

tOrms of tax credits, su bsidies, or in novation prizes;

Many LMI individuals lack access to financial ser

and a proposal under \\'hich the Treasury \\'Ould di

vices, such as checking accounts or easily utilized sav

rect deposit tax refunds into opt-out bank accounts

ings opportunities, that 1niddle-incon1e families take

auton1atically set up at tax tin1e. 'I"he proposals arc de

for granted. High-cost financial services, barriers to

signed to induce the private sector to change their ac

savings, lack of insurance, and credit constraints in

count offerings by offering government inducen1ent

crease the economic challenges faced by LMI fa1nilies.

to reach scale, as v.rcll as to alter consun1cr behavior

In the short run, it is often hard fOr these f31nilies to

through the structure of the accounts offered. In par

deal v.rith fluctuations in income that occur because

ticular, the govern1nent seal of approval, tax credit or

of job changes, instability in hours \\'orked, medi

subsidy, or bundling through the direct deposit of tax

cal emergencies, changes in f3mily composition, or a

refunds changes the scoring to firms for oftering such

myriad of other tJ.ctors that cause abrupt changes in

products, \Vhile the opt-out nature of the proposal

economic inf!o\VS and outflO\VS. At lo\V income levels,

and other behavioral t\veaks change the starting rules.
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()nc re)·Jtivdy "light touch" approach to in1prov

used to pay for tax preparation, setting up such ac

ing outcon1cs in this area \Vould be to ofter a gov�

counts could help to reduce the incentives to take out

crnn1cnt "gold sc.11" for financial institutions offering

costly refund loans, incentives that are magnified by

sate and affr)rdablc bank accounts. While the gold seal

ten1poral 1nyopia and misunderstanding regarding the

\vould not change the costs of the accounts the1n

costs of credit. Such accounts would also eliminate

selves, it might increase the potency of the bank's

the need to use costly check-cashing services fr>r one's

n1arkcting and thus reduce acquisition costs; also, the

tax refund check. Moreover, the account could con

good\vill gcncr,1ted n1ight i1nprovc the bank's in1age

tinue to be used past tax tin1e. Households could use

overall and thus contribute to profitability. Sin1ilarly,

the account like any other bank account-to receive

s111,1ll prizes fi:lr innovation in serving LMI customtrs

their income, save, pay bills, and, of course, to receive

1night heighten attention to the issue and increase in

their refund in follc)\ving years. There are a variety of

vcstn1cnt in research and develop1nent of technology

\\'ays to structure these accounts, all of \Vhich \Vould

to serve the poor. Grants to local con11nunities and

deploy opt-out strategies and government bundling

nonprofits n1ay increase their outreach and in1prove

to reach scale and better align the costs of overcom

the provision of financial cJucation and infOrrnation

ing consun1er bias \Vith the shared benefit of 111ov

and help b<u1ks and credit unions reach out to LMI

ing households into the banking system . Such an ap

custon1crs.

proach could efficiently bring n1illions of households

l'o overcon1e the problc1n of the high fixed costs of

into the banking systen1.

offering sensible transaction accounts to lo\v-inco1ne

The po\ver of these initiatives could be significantly

individuals \Vith lo\v savings levels, Congress could

increased if it \Vere coupled \Vith a series of behavior

en;.1ct a ta>. credit fr)r financial institlltions that of}Cr

ally infOrn1cd efforts to i111prove the take-up of the

safe and affordable bank accounts to LMI households

accounts and the savings outcon1es for account hold

(B,1rr 2004, 2007). The tax credit \\'Otild be pay-for

ers. For exa1nple, banks could encourage en1ployers

perfonnancc, \Vith financial institutions able to clain1

to endorse direct deposit and auton1atic sayings plans

tax credits tOr a fixed an1ount per account opened by

to set up default rules that \Vould increase savings

LMI households. The accounts eligible for tax credit

outcon1es. With an auto1natic savings plan, accounts

could be structured and priced by the private sector

could be structured so that holders could designate a

according to essential terms required by regulation.

portion of their paycheck to be deposited into a sav

i-::or exa1nple, costly and inefficient checking accounts

ings «pocket"; the savings feature \\'Ould rely on the

\Vith a high risk of overdraft \VOtild be eschev.'Cd in

prccon11nitn1ent device of auton1atic savings, and the

tavor of kl\v-cost, k)\v-risk accounts \Vith only debit

funds \vould be some\vhat 1nore difficult to access than

card ,1ccess. The accounts \\'Otild be debit-card based,

those in the regular bank account to make the com-

\Vith no check-\\'riting capability\ no overdrafts per-

1nitment n1ore likely to stick. To provide the necessary

1nitted, and no C:hexSyste1ns rejections for past ac

access to e1nergency funds in a more cost-effective

count tJilures in the absence of fraud or other mean

manner than is usually available to LMI households,

ingfi.11 abuse.

the bank account could also include a six-1nonth con

Direct-deposit tax refund accounts could be used

su1ner loan \Vith direct deposit and direct debit, using

to encourage saYings and expanded access to bank

relationship banking and auton1ated pay111ent systems

ing services, \vhile reducing reliance on costly refund

to provide an alternative to costly payday loans. With

anticipation loans and check-cashing services (Barr

direct deposit of income and direct debit of interest

2004, 2007). Under the plan, unbanked lo\\'-inco111e

and principal due, the loan should be relatiYely lo\v

households \Vho file their tax returns \Vould haYc their

risk and costless fOr the bank to service. With a lon

tax refunds directly deposited into a ne\v account.

ger pay1nent period than in typical payday lending,

l)ircct deposit is significantly cheaper and taster than

the loan should be 1nore manageable fOr consumers

paper checks, both fi>r the government and for taxpay

living paycheck to paycheck and \vould likely lead to

er.�. Ta xpayers could choose to opt out of the systein

less repeated borro\ving undertaken to stay current

if they did not \Vant to directly deposit their refund,

on past loans. Moreover, the loan repayn1ent features

but the expectation is that the accounts \Votild be

could also include a provision that consumers "pay

\vidcly accepted since they \Vould significantly reduce

the1nselvcs first," by including a savings deposit to

the costs and expedite the tin1ing of receiving one's

their account \Vith every payment. Such a prcco1nmit

tax refund. By using an opt-out strategy and reach

ment device could overcome the bias to procrastinate

ing households at tax tin1e, this approach couJd help

in savings and reduce the Jikchh ood of needing future

to 0Yercon1c the tendency to procrastinate in setting

emergency borrowing. All these efforts could increase

up accounts. By reducing the tin1e it takes to receive

take up of the banking product and lead to improved

a refund and pern1itting a portion of the funds to be

savings outcomes.

BEHAVIORALLY INFORMED REGULATION

The federal government under President Obarna
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retains the classical perspective of consumers interact

has made some progress to\vard these objectives over

ing \\'ith firms in competiti\'e nlarkets. The difference

the last couple of years. The Treasury Department has

is that consumers are no\v understood to be fallible

launched pilot programs to test different product at

in systematic and important \vays, and firms are seen

tributes, including debit cards and payroll cards, and

to have incentives to overcome or to exploit these

the FDIC: has launched a pilot \Vith a group of banks

shortcomings.

to test consumer demand and sustainability of a sate

More generally, fir1ns not only \\'ill operate on the

and affordable account, using an FDIC template, or

contour defined by human psychology but also \viii

gofd seal. Finally, the Treasury obtained authorization

respond strategically to regulations. And finns get to

in the Dodd-Frank Act to experin1ent with a variety of

act last. Because the firm has a great deal of latitude

methods to increase access to bank accounts for lo\v

in issue fiaming, product design, and so on, they have

incorne households, including the provision of seed

the capacity to affect consumer behavior and in so

money for research and development into innovative

doing to circumvent or pervert regulatory constraints.

technology and services.

Ironically, firms' capacity to do so is enhanced by their
interaction

Conclusion

ivith "behavioral" consumers (as opposed

to the hypothetically rational consumers of neoclassi 
cal cconon1ic theory), since so many of the things a
regulator would find hard or undesirable to control

We have proposed a conceptual framework for behav

(e.g. tiames, design nuance, complexity) can be used

iorally infor1ned regulation. The frame\\'ork relies on a

to influence consumers' behavior greatly. The chal

n1ore nuanced understanding of human behavior than

lenge of behaviorally intOrmed regulation, therefore,

is fOund in the classical rational actor model, which

is to envision not only the role of human behavior, but

underlies inuch policy thinking. Whereas the classi

also the \\'ays in \vhich firn1s are likely to respond to

cal perspective generally assumes people kno\\.' what is

consumer behavior and to the structure of regulation.

important and knowable, that they plan \vith insight

We have developed a model in which outcon1es are

and patience, and that they carry out their plans \\1ith

an equilibrium interaction between individuals \Vith

\Visdom and self-control, the central gist of the behav

specific psychologies and firms that respond to those

ioral perspective is that people often fail to know and

psychologies within specific markets. l"hese outcomes

understand things that matter; that they misperceive,

may not be socially optimal. To the extent that the

rnisallocate, inispredict, and fail to carry out their in

interaction produces real harm, regulation could ad

tended plans; that the context in \vhich they function

dress the potential social \Velfare implications of this

has great impact; and that institutions shape defaults,

equilibriun1. Taking both individual psychology and

planning, and behavior itself Behaviorally informed

industrial organization seriously suggests the need tOr

regulation is cognizant of the importance of framing

policy makers to consider a range of market-context

and defaults, of the gap bet\veen information and un

specific policy options, including both changing the

derstanding and benveen intention and action, and

"rules" of the game, as well as changing its "scoring."

of the role of decisional conflict and other psycho

We have explored some specific applications of this

logical factors that affect ho\v people behave. At the

conceptual frame\vork for financial services.

same time, \Ve argue, behaviorally informed regula
tion needs to take into account not only behavioral
insights about individuals but also economic insights

Notes

about 1narkets.
In this frame\\'ork, successful regulation requires

1 . In addition to incentives to increase savings, employers

integrating a more nuanced vie\\-' of hun1an behavior

also seek to boost en1ployee retention, and they must com

\Vith an understanding of markets. Markets have been

ply \Vith federal pension rules designed to ensure that the

shoivn to systematicaJly favor overcoming behavloral

plan5 an: not "top heavy. " Moreover, there are significant

biases in some contexts and to systematically fiivor ex

con1pliance issues regarding pensions and retiren1ent plans,

ploiting those biases in other contexts . A central illus

disclosure failures, fee churning and complicated and costly

tration of this distinction is the contrast between the

fee structures, and conflicts of interest in plan managen1ent,

market for saving and that fOr borro\ving-in \\-'hich

as \veil as problems with encouraging employers to sign up

the same fundamental hu1nan tendency to underap

luv...·"'':age workers fOr retirement plans. Yet, as a comparative

preciate the impact of compounding interest leads

matter, 1narket incentiYes to overco1ne psychological biases

to opposite market reactions. In the savings context,

in order to encourage saving arc more aligned with optimal

firms seek to overcome the bias; in the credit con

social policy than arc nlarket incentives to exacerbate psy

text, they seek to exploit it. Our fra1nC\\'Ork largely

chological biases to encourage borro\ving.
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2. \Ve use this bin1odal franlC\vork of regulatory choice

in the fOrm of a higher interest rate rather than in the fOnn

to sin1p!ify the exploration of ho\\' our n1odel of individual

of a cash payment, the evidence suggests that YSPs are in

psychology and firm incentives affects regulation. We ac

fact used to compensate brokers for getting bornnvcrs to

kno\vkdgc that the regulatory choice matrix is n1ore com

accept higher interest rates, prepayment penalties, and other

plex (see Barr, 2005).

loan tcrn1s.

3. This is largely because of the existing regulatory
fran1e\vork: pension regulation gives en1ploycrs incentives to

1 2 . See also Guttentag (2000).
1 3 . See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer

enroll lowcr-incon1c individnals in 40l(k) progran1s. Absent

Protection Act of 2005, Pub L. No. 109-8, 1 1 9 Stat. 23

these, it is likely that firn1s \vould he happy to discourage

(codified at 1 1 U.S.<:. § 1 0 1 ct seq (2005)).

enrollment since they often n1ust pay the n1atch fi)r these
individuals. This point is interesting because it suggests that
even defaults in savings only \Vork because some other regu
lation "changed the scoring" of the gan1e.

14. See, e.g., U. S. General Accounting Office (2006).
1 5 . Sec, e.g., ()fficc of the Comptroller of the c:urrcney
(2003, 2004a, 2004b ).
16. Sec Federal Reserve Board (2007b).

4. This example abstracts fron1 collection coses (\�:hich

1 7 . federal Reserve Board, Proposed Ruic, 12 C.FR. 226,

\vould reduce finns' incentives to hide borro\ving costs) and

prnpo"<l §.7(b)( l2), implementing 15 U.S.C. §1 637(b)( l l ).

instead frKuses on the short-term behavior generally exhib
ited by firms, as in the recent home 1nortgage crisis.

1 8 . Buehler, Ciriffin, and Ross (2002 ); Kochler and Poon,
(2005).

5. In the interests of fi.ill disclosure, one of us (Barr), \Vas

19. Barr (2007). For a related proposal, see Gordon and

the assistant secretary of the treasury tOr financial institu 

Douglas (2005), in \vhich they argue tOr an opt-out direct

tions from 2009 to 2 0 1 0 and led the effort to put in place a

dcbit arrangctncnt fr)r credit cards.

number of these retOrn1s in the CARD Act, the Dodd-.frank
Act, and other Treasury initiatives.
6. See Federal Reserve Board, Final Rule Amending
Regulation
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